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Abstract
A probabilistic belief revision function assigns to every initial probabilistic belief and every
observable event some revised probabilistic belief that only attaches positive probability to
states in this event. We propose three axioms for belief revision functions: (1) linearity,
meaning that if the decision maker observes that the true state is in {a, b}, and hence
state c is impossible, then the proportions of c’s initial probability that are shifted to a
and b, respectively, should be independent of c’s initial probability; (2) transitivity, stating
that if the decision maker deems belief β equally similar to states a and b, and deems β
equally similar to states b and c, then he should deem β equally similar to states a and c;
(3) information-order independence, stating that the way in which information is received
should not matter for the eventual revised belief. We show that a belief revision function
satisfies the three axioms above if and only if there is some linear one-to-one function ϕ,
transforming the belief simplex into a polytope that is closed under orthogonal projections,
such that the belief revision function satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ. By
the latter, we mean that the decision maker, when having initial belief β1 and observing the
event E, always chooses the revised belief β2 that attaches positive probability only to states
in E and for which ϕ(β2) has minimal Euclidean distance to ϕ(β1).
Keywords : Belief revision, probabilistic beliefs, non-Bayesian updating.
JEL Classification: C73, D81, D83.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Outline
Beliefs and belief revision play a fundamental role in decision making, both on a professional
and an informal level. For instance, a physician who is uncertain about the precise disease of
a patient may prescribe a treatment on the basis of the subjective probabilities, or beliefs, he
assigns to each of the possible diseases. Upon observing new symptoms, the physician may
exclude some of these diseases, and may redistribute the probabilities assigned to the excluded
diseases among the diseases he still deems possible. For the eventual treatment to be prescribed,
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project. I also thank Luis Gonzalez, Werner Gu¨th, Peter Wakker and Anthony Ziegelmeyer for helpful discussions.
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Figure 1: An introductory example
it is therefore crucial how the physician redistributes these probabilities, that is, how he revises
his beliefs upon receiving this new information. In this paper we shall focus on exactly this
problem, namely how decision makers may revise their probabilistic beliefs upon acquiring new
information.
In most decision theoretic and game theoretic models, it is assumed that the decision maker
(or player) revises his subjective beliefs by Bayesian updating whenever the newly acquired
information does not rule out all states to which he previously assigned positive probabilities.
Whereas this assumption is completely natural if the uncertain events have well-known objective
probabilities, we shall argue in the next few paragraphs that Bayesian updating may not be the
only reasonable way of revising beliefs when no such objective probabilities exist.
As to clarify this point, consider the game tree in Figure 1. We analyze the situation from
player 2’s viewpoint. Assume that player 2 believes that player 1 is rational, but that player 2
has uncertainty about player 1’s preference relation over his actions. More precisely, player 2
believes that one of the following three states is the true state:
state A : a ≻ c ≻ b;
state B : b ≻ c ≻ a;
state C : c ≻ a ≻ b.
Hence, A is the state where player 1 strictly prefers a over c and strictly prefers c over b. Similarly
for states B and C. Suppose first that player 1 is drawn randomly from a large population of
rational players of which it is known that exactly one third has preference relation A, one third
has preference relation B and one third has preference relation C. As such, player 2 will assign
probability one third to states A,B and C before the game starts, since these probabilities
coincide with the relative frequencies of the states in the population. When player 2 has to
choose at his information set, he knows that player 1 has not chosen c, and hence must conclude
that state C is no longer possible. Since the new relative frequencies of A and B, conditional
on the event that C does not occur, are both one half, player 2 ’s revised probabilities assigned
to A and B should be one half, as Bayesian updating suggests.
Consider next the situation where no such population exists, but where player 2 assigns
subjective probability one to state C before the game starts. Upon observing that his information
set is reached, he must conclude that C is not the true state, and hence must revise his subjective
belief. The idea of minimal belief revision (see Schulte (2002), for instance, for an excellent
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discussion of this idea and an overview of the literature) suggests that the new belief should be
“as similar as possible” to the previous belief while explaining the newly observed event that
player 1 has not chosen c. Among the states A and B that could explain this event, state A
seems to be the state that, intuitively, is most similar to C. Namely, preference relations A and
C only differ on one pairwise ranking of actions, {a, c}, whereas B and C differ on two pairwise
rankings, {a, b} and {b, c}. As such, the concept of minimal belief revision suggests that player
2’s revised belief should attach a higher probability to A, the “more similar state”, than to B,
the “less similar state”.
A similar line of reasoning can be adopted, however, if player 2 initially assigns subjective
probability one third to states A,B and C, instead of initially assigning subjective belief one
to C. In this case, player 2, upon observing that his information set is reached, faces the task
of redistributing the weight one third, initially assigned to the excluded state C, among the
non-excluded states A and B. Within the spirit of minimal belief revision as discussed above,
player 2 should then transfer more than fifty percent of this weight to state A. As a consequence,
minimal belief revision leads player 2’s revised belief to assign a higher probability to A than to
B, and hence would lead to a different revised belief than obtained by Bayesian updating. The
crucial difference with the first scenario discussed above, in which the state was randomly drawn
from a population with known proportions, is that in the first scenario the event of reaching
player 2’s information set does not change player 2’s belief in the objective a-priori probabilities
of states A,B and C. Therefore, player 2 has no reason to change his belief about the relative
likelihoods of A and B, and hence Bayesian updating is the only sensible way of revising the
beliefs. In the last scenario, however, no such objective a-priori probabilities exist. The initial
subjective probabilities assigned to states A,B and C only reflect player 2’s initial personal
opinion about the relative likelihoods of the states. In particular, upon observing that player 1
has not chosen c, he may change his opinion about the relative likelihoods of A and B, and the
concept of minimal belief revision indeed suggests player 2 to do so.
In this paper we propose a model of probabilistic belief revision that incorporates this idea of
minimal belief revision. To this purpose, we first define the concept of a belief revision function
which is a function that assigns to every possible initial belief and every possible event some
revised belief attaching probability zero to all states outside this event. We then require that the
decision maker, upon observing that the real state is in {a, b} and state c is impossible, should
redistribute the weight initially attached to c among the non-excluded states in exactly the same
way as he would have done if he initially assigned weight one to c. As an illustration, suppose
that in the example above player 2 initially assigns subjective probability one to C, and upon
observing that his information set has been reached assigns probability α to A and probability
1 − α to B. These revised probabilities intuitively reflect the similarity between C and A, as
opposed to the similarity between C and B, as perceived by player 2: The higher α, the higher
the perceived similarity between C and A compared to the perceived similarity between C and
B. We then require that, if player 2 would initially assign probability β(C) < 1 to C, he should
redistribute the weight β(C) among the states A and B using these same proportions α and 1−α.
That is, the revised probabilities of A and B should be β(A) +αβ(C) and β(B) + (1−α)β(C),
respectively, where β(A) and β(B) are the initial probabilities of A and B. Throughout the
paper we shall refer to this condition as linearity, as it implies that the revised belief depends
linearly upon the initial belief.
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The second condition we impose on a belief revision function states that, whenever the
decision maker deems belief β “equally similar” to states x and y, and deems β “equally similar”
to states y and z, he should deem β “equally similar” to states x and z. Here, by “β equally
similar to states x and y” we mean that the decision maker, when having initial belief β and upon
observing the event that only states x and y are possible, assigns equal probabilities to x and
y. The second condition thus states that the “equally-similar-to relation” should be transitive.
For this reason, we call this condition transitivity.
The third and final condition we impose states that it should not matter for the revised
belief whether the acquired information is received at once or stepwise, and in the latter case it
should not matter in which order the various pieces of information are received. This condition
is called information-order independence.
Our main theorem shows that a belief revision function is linear, transitive and information-
order independendent if and only if it satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to some linear
one-to-one function ϕ transforming the simplex of beliefs into some polytope that is closed under
orthogonal projections. By minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ we mean that the decision
maker, when having initial belief β1 and observing event E, should choose the revised belief β2
such that ϕ(β2) has the least Euclidean distance to ϕ(β1) amongst the beliefs that are compatible
with E. Here, the vector ϕ(β) may be interpreted as a list of characteristics that describes the
belief β. As such, stating that the belief revision function satisfies minimal belief revision with
respect to ϕ means that the decision maker always selects the revised belief for which the list of
characteristics is as close as possible to the list of characteristics of the initial belief. By “closed
under orthogonal projections” we mean that for every point in the polytope, its orthogonal
projection on each of the faces is contained in the polytope.
As to illustrate how the function ϕ may be chosen naturally in particular examples, consider
again the game tree of Figure 1. Let [A], [B] and [C] be the beliefs that assign probability one to
the states A,B and C, respectively. A possible, natural way to choose the list of characteristics
ϕ([A]) for belief [A] would be to identify [A] with a Boolean vector of size 3 stating for each of
the pairwise rankings a ≻ b, a ≻ c and b ≻ c whether it is true or false. By substituting ‘1’ for
‘true’ and ‘0’ for false, one would thus define ϕ([A]) = (1, 1, 0). Similarly, ϕ([B]) = (0, 0, 1) and
ϕ([C]) = (1, 0, 0). By linearity of ϕ, we must define ϕ(β) = β(A)ϕ([A])+β(B)ϕ([B])+β(C)ϕ([C])
for every belief β. Hence, the list of characteristics ϕ(β) specifies for each of the three pairwise
rankings above the probability β attaches to the event of this ranking being true, and this list
could then be used as a criterion to define the distance between two beliefs. In particular, if
the decision maker initially holds the belief β1 = [C] and observes the event that c has not been
chosen, then the revised belief β2 whose list of characteristics ϕ(β2) is closest to ϕ(β1) is given
by β2 = (
2
3
, 1
3
, 0) assigning probability 2/3 to A and probability 1/3 to B. As a consequence, the
belief revision function that satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ should prescribe
the revised belief (2
3
, 1
3
, 0) in this situation, reflecting the fact that the decision maker deems C
more similar to A than to B.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of a belief
revision function and the axioms of linearity, transitivity and information-order independence
as discussed above. In Section 3 we present the main theorem of this paper. In Section 4
we provide the reader with an overview of the proof of the main theorem. We present the
lemmas that are used to show the main result, and present for each lemma an intuitive, often
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geometrical, argument that reveals the main ideas behind the formal proof. The full algebraic
proofs are presented in the appendix. The reason for this procedure is that the proof is rather
long, and therefore we prefer to give the reader an overview of the main steps first, before
confronting him or her with all the technical details. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion
of the main theorem and its proof.
1.2 Related Literature
The problem of belief revision has been studied in many different areas, including logic, philoso-
phy, computer science, decision theory and game theory. The study of this problem in the former
three areas has led to a separate field, known as belief revision theory. Our approach is similar
to most investigations in belief revision theory in the sense that we put restrictions directly on
the belief revision function, rather than embedding the belief revision function into one-person
or multi-person decision problems, as is common in decision theory and game theory. Within
the area of belief revision theory, our representation theorem is similar, in spirit, to Grove’s
representation theorem of (non-probabilistic) belief revision functions (Grove (1988)). Grove
has shown that a belief revision function satisfies the AGM-axioms (Alchourro´n and Makinson
(1982), Ga¨rdenfors (1988)) if and only if for every initial belief, consisting of some subset of
states1, there exists some plausibility ranking on the set of states such that for every piece
of new information, the revised belief contains all those states that are most plausible among
the states that are compatible with the new information. In our representation theorem, the
plausibility of each revised belief β2 is measured according to the Euclidean distance between
ϕ(β2) and ϕ(β1), where β1 is the initial belief. Within this interpretation, the decision maker in
our model always chooses the revised belief β2 that is most plausible, given the initial belief β1,
among all beliefs that are compatible with the new information. Our representation theorem
may thus be interpreted as a probabilistic variant of Grove’s representation theorem.
In decision theory, the common approach to belief revision is to extract the decision maker’s
belief revision function from his preferences over acts, or menus of acts, in a dynamic decision
problem. Many papers focus on the relationship between belief revision on the one hand, and
dynamic consistency of preferences, or the violation thereof, on the other hand. Intuitively,
dynamic consistency means that, upon observing some non-null event, the decision maker should
rank two acts in the same way as he would have done initially, before observing this event.
Ghirardato (2002) studies a model in which the decision maker, for any possible event, holds
a conditional preference relation over Savage-acts (Savage (1954)), and imposes axioms which
guarantee that these conditional preferences can be represented by subjective expected utility
functions. The paper shows that the conditional preferences are dynamically consistent if and
only if the decision maker uses the same utility function for every observable event, and the
induced belief revision function satisfies Bayesian updating. Epstein and Schneider (2003) prove
that a similar result is true for conditional preferences over Anscombe-Aumann acts (Anscombe
and Aumann (1963)), although studying a broader framework in which conditional preferences
may, but need not, be of the subjective expected utility type. Since the class of belief revision
functions studied in our paper does not satisfy Bayesian updating, the two results above imply
1The interpretation is that the decision maker initially believes that one of the states in the subset is the true
state, without exactly knowing which one (if the subset contains more than one state, of course).
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that embedding these belief revision functions into a dynamic decision problem with expected
utility preferences necessarily leads to dynamically inconsistent preferences. Consequently, if
a subjective expected utility maximizer in a dynamic decision problem uses a belief revision
function that satisfies our three axioms, he should anticipate on the fact that his preferences over
acts may change in the future due to new information about the state. A similar phenomenon
is studied in Epstein (2005), who proposes an alternative model in which the decision maker’s
preferences over acts change over time due to non-Bayesian belief revision. Epstein’s model,
which is based upon Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), considers a decision maker who has preferences
over menus of acts, rather than over single acts alone. When choosing a menu of acts, the
decision maker should anticipate on the fact that his preferences over acts within the menu may
change in the future, when receiving new information about the state. Epstein then imposes
axioms on the decision maker’s preference relation over menus of acts which allow the decision
maker to use a belief revision function that differs from Bayesian updating. More precisely,
a preference relation that satisfies the axioms induces a belief revision function which, upon
receiving new information about the state, generates a revised belief that can be written as a
convex combination of the Bayesian update of the initial belief and some other revised belief
which may significantly differ from this Bayesian update.
In the game-theoretic literature on belief revision, an important role is played by the re-
lationship between belief revision and the one-deviation property. By the latter, we mean the
condition that a vector of ad interim optimal actions for a player always induces an ex ante
optimal strategy. That is, if a player, at each of his information sets, chooses an action that is
optimal given his conditional belief about the opponents’ strategies, and that correctly antici-
pates on his own behavior at future information sets, then this will lead to a strategy that is ex
ante optimal from each of his information sets onwards. It may be verified that dynamic con-
sistency of preferences implies the one-deviation property. Hendon, Jacobsen and Sloth (1996)
prove, within an equilibrium framework, that every pre-consistent belief revision function satis-
fies the one-deviation principle, whereas Perea (2002) shows that an appropriate weakening of
pre-consistency, termed updating consistency, is not only a sufficient condition, but also a nec-
essary condition for the one-deviation principle. Both conditions, pre-consistency and updating
consistency, are closely related to Bayesian updating. Since belief revision functions satisfying
our three axioms will typically not satisfy updating consistency when incorporated in a dynamic
game, it follows that our model of belief revision is in conflict with the one-deviation property.
The reason is that within our model, a player who must choose an action at the present in-
formation set h1 and at some future information set h2, cannot evaluate the optimality of his
actions at h2 with his present beliefs at h1, since his conditional preferences at h2 are in conflict
with his initial preferences at h1. Rather, at h1 he should correctly anticipate on the action he
would choose at h2, given his future conditional belief at h2, and subsequently should choose
the action at h1 that is optimal given his conditional belief at h1 about the opponents’ choices,
and given his own future choice at h2.
Within the existing literature on belief revision, the paper that perhaps comes closest to
ours is Majumdar (2004). Similar to our model, it imposes several axioms on probabilistic belief
revision functions. It should be mentioned that Majumdar’s definition of a belief revision func-
tion is more restrictive, as it is only defined whenever the observed event does not rule out all
states that are attached positive probability by the initial belief. In our model, a belief revision
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function is also defined for these cases. The crucial difference between the two models lies in the
belief revision functions that are characterized by the axioms: While our axioms characterize a
class of belief revision functions that does not satisfy Bayesian updating, Majumdar’s axioms
characterize exactly Bayesian updating. As such, it may be interesting to compare these two
sets of axioms here. Majumdar’s axioms are: (1) path independence, which is identical to our
axiom of information-order independence; (2) symmetry, stating that if the initial probabilities
are permuted, the revised probabilities should be permuted by the same permutation; (3) con-
tinuity, stating that the revised belief should depend continuously upon the initial belief; (4)
monotonicity, stating that the revised probability on a state should be as least as large as the
initial probability on a state; and (5) no mistake hypothesis, stating that if some state initially
has probability zero, then the revised probability on that state should remain zero. The main
result in this paper is to show that a belief revision function satisfies the axioms (1) - (5) if and
only if it satisfies Bayesian updating.
On the other hand, our axioms of linearity, transitivity and information-order independence
characterize belief revision functions that satisfy minimal belief revision with respect to some
function ϕ that is linear, one-to-one, and closed under orthogonal projections. It is easily
seen that each such function satisfies path independence, continuity and monotonicity, but not
symmetry and the no mistake hypothesis. In the example of Figure 1, for instance, take the
function ϕ we have constructed above, and assume that the decision maker initially assigns
equal weight to states A and B. If the decision maker observes that state C is impossible, and if
the belief revision function satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ, then more weight
should be shifted towards A (the state more similar to C) than to B (the state less similar
to C), and hence the revised probability on A will be larger than the revised probability on
B. Symmetry, on the other hand, implies that the revised probabilities on A and B should
be equal. Hence, symmetry is violated. In order to see that in this example the no mistake
hypothesis is violated also, assume that the decision maker initially assigns probability zero to
A and probabilities 1/2 to both B and C. If he observes that C is ruled out, and satisfies minimal
belief revision with respect to ϕ, then he assigns positive probability to A in the revised belief.
The reason is that he shifts a strictly positive part of the weight 1/2, initially assigned to C,
towards A, the state more similar to C. As a consequence, minimal belief revision with respect
to ϕ implies that a decision maker may initially believe that some state has probability zero, but
believe later on that this same state has positive probability. This makes sense, since assigning
probability zero to a state does not necessarily mean that one deems this state completely
impossible. It only means that one deems this state considerably less plausible than some of the
other states. If a decision maker observes that some of the states that he deemed plausible is no
longer possible, than he may transfer a part of its weight towards a state that is similar to the
excluded state, but that he deemed implausible before. Thus, a subjectively implausible state
may be turned into a subjective plausible state whenever it is similar to a state that is excluded
by the newly acquired information, and that was deemed subjectively plausible before.
Reversely, it is easily seen that Bayesian updating satisfies our axioms of transitivity and
information-order independence, but violates our axiom of linearity. Hence, the axioms of sym-
metry and no mistake hypothesis in Majumdar’s model, and the axiom of linearity in our model,
are precisely the axioms that distinguish Bayesian updating from the notion of minimal belief
revision discussed here.
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2 Belief Revision Functions
In this section we introduce the notion of a belief revision function, and propose the axioms
of linearity, transitivity and information-order independence. Let X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} be some
finite set of states. A probabilistic belief (or simply belief ) on X is a probability distribution on
X. We denote by B(X) the set of all beliefs on X. For two beliefs β1, β2 in B(X) and a number
λ ∈ [0, 1], let λβ1 + (1 − λ)β2 be the belief that assigns to every state x ∈ X the probability
λβ1(x) + (1 − λ)β2(x). For a given state x, let [x] be the belief that assigns probability one to
x. A subset E ⊆ X of states is called an event. By B(X|E) we denote the set of beliefs on X
that assign positive probability only to states in E.
Definition 2.1 (Belief revision function) A belief revision function on X is a function br that
assigns to every belief β ∈ B(X) and every event E ⊆ X some belief br(β|E) ∈ B(X|E).
Here, β represents the initial belief a person holds about the state in X, whereas br(β|E)
represents the revised belief after receiving the information that the state is in E.
In order to introduce the axiom of linearity, assume that the decision maker initially assigns
probability one to some state c, but later observes that the true state is in {a, b}. Suppose that,
after observing this event, he attaches probability α > 1/2 to a and probability 1− α < 1/2 to
b, that is, br([c]|{a, b}) = α[a] + (1 − α)[b]. Then, within the spirit of minimal belief revision,
the revised belief reveals that the decision maker deems c more similar to a than to b, since he
shifts more weight towards a than towards b. Moreover, the precise numbers α and 1−α reveal
how much more similar he deems c to a compared to b: the higher α, the higher the perceived
similarity between c and a compared to the perceived similarity between c and b. Consider now
a different situation in which he initially assigns probability β(c) < 1 to c, and later observes
the event {a, b}. He then faces a similar task as before, since he must shift the total weight β(c)
initially assigned to c towards the non-excluded states a and b. Since we may assume that the
relative perceived similarities between c and a as compared to c and b are still given by the
numbers α and 1−α above, minimal belief revision suggests that he should shift the proportion
α of β(c) to a, and shift the proportion 1 − α of β(c) to b. That is, the proportions of weight
β(c) that are shifted towards a and b, respectively, are given by the revised belief br([c]|{a, b}),
and are independent of the initial weight β(c) assigned to the excluded state c. By applying this
reasoning to every state x that is excluded by the event {a, b}, we obtain the axiom of linearity.
Axiom 2.2 (Linearity) For every initial belief β ∈ B(X) and every two states a, b ∈ X, it
should hold that
br(β|{a, b}) = β(a)[a] + β(b)[b] +
∑
x∈X\{a,b}
β(x)br([x]|{a, b}).
In particular, linearity implies that br(β|{a, b}) = β whenever β assigns positive probability
only to states in {a, b}. That is, if the initial belief β is already in accordance with the event
{a, b} , the belief should not be changed. Mathematically speaking, the axiom of linearity implies
that, for some fixed event E = {a, b}, the revised belief is a linear function of the initial belief.
The first triangle in Figure 2 illustrates this fact for the state space X = {a, b, c}, the fixed
8
a b
c c
a b
Figure 2: Linear versus Bayesian belief revision
event E = {a, b} and various initial beliefs in B(X). This is an example of a decision maker
who deems c more similar to a than to b, and who therefore always shifts more weight towards
a than towards b. As a comparison, the second triangle illustrates how Bayesian belief revision
operates for the same event E and the same initial beliefs. Hence, geometrically speaking, the
crucial difference between linear belief revision and Bayesian belief revision is that the former
always revises beliefs in the same direction, namely towards the state that is perceived most
similar to the excluded state c, while the direction of revision in Bayesian belief revision is
completely determined by the initial relative weights assigned to the non-excluded states a and
b, and therefore varies for different initial beliefs. As a consequence, the revised beliefs in a linear
belief revision function are Lipschitz-continuous with respect to the initial belief, meaning that
small changes in the initial belief always lead to small changes in the revised belief, while the
revised belief in Bayesian belief revision may change dramatically in response to small changes
in the initial belief close to [c].
The second axiom, transitivity, states that, whenever a belief β is perceived “equally similar”
to states a and b, and is perceived “equally similar” to states b and c, then the belief β should
be perceived “equally similar” to states a and c. Here, this “equally-similar-to” relation may be
deduced from the belief revision function. Suppose, namely, that the initial belief β ∈ B(X)
and the states a, b ∈ X are such that br(β|{a, b}) = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[b]. Then, the revision of the belief
β upon observing that all states but a and b are excluded is exactly halfway between [a] and
[b], and hence, intuitively, the initial belief β was deemed equally similar to the probability one
beliefs [a] and [b]. In other words, the belief β is perceived equally similar to the states a and b.
The transitivity axiom simply imposes that this “equally-similar-to” relation be transitive.
Axiom 2.3 (Transitivity) For every initial belief β ∈ B(X) and every three different states
a, b, c ∈ X for which br(β|{a, b}) = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[b] and br(β|{a, c}) = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c], it should also hold
that br(β|{b, c}) = 1
2
[b] + 1
2
[c].
Geometrically speaking, within the state space X = {a, b, c} the transitivity axiom connects
the direction of revision upon receiving information {a, c} to the revision directions with respect
to the events {a, b} and {b, c}. Figure 3 provides an illustration of this fact. The last axiom,
information-order independence, states that it should not matter in which particular form infor-
mation is received. For instance, it should not make a difference whether the information that
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2
[a] + 1
2
[c] 1
2
[b] + 1
2
[c]
1
2
[a] + 1
2
[b]
Figure 3: Transitivity
states a and b are no longer possible is received at once, or that first the information excluding
a is received followed by the information excluding b.
Axiom 2.4 (Information-order independence) For every initial belief β ∈ B(X) and every two
events E1, E2 ⊆ X with E2 ⊆ E1, it holds that
br(β|E2) = br(br(β|E1)|E2).
Figure 4 illustrates this axiom for the case of four states, with state space X = {a, b, c, d}
and events E1 = {a, b, c} and E2 = {b, c}.
3 Representation Theorem
Intuitively, a belief revision function br satisfies minimal belief revision if for every initial belief
β1 and every event E, the function br selects the revised belief β2 in B(X|E) that is “most
similar” to β1. A possible way to formalize the phrase “most similar” would be to identify
each belief β with some vector ϕ(β), and to require that ϕ(β2) should have minimal Euclidean
distance to ϕ(β1) amongst all beliefs in B(X|E). Formally, let Rm be some Euclidean space
with m ∈ N, and let ϕ be some one-to-one function from B(X) to Rm. For every two vectors
v,w ∈ Rm, we denote by ‖v − w‖ the Euclidean distance between v and w.
Definition 3.1 (Minimal belief revision) We say that the belief revision function br satisfies
minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ if for every initial belief β1 ∈ B(X) and every event
E ⊆ X :
‖ϕ(br(β1|E))) − ϕ(β1)‖ ≤ ‖ϕ(β2)− ϕ(β1)‖
for all β2 ∈ B(X|E).
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Figure 4: Information-order independence
The main theorem in this paper states that a belief revision function br is linear, transitive
and information-order independent if and only if there is some linear one-to-one function ϕ,
closed under orthogonal projections, such that br satisfies minimal belief revision with respect
to ϕ. We first formalize what we mean by “linear” and “closed under orthogonal projections”.
Definition 3.2 (Linear function) A function ϕ : B(X)→ Rm is called linear if for every belief
β ∈ B(X) we have that
ϕ(β) =
∑
x∈X
β(x)ϕ([x]).
In this paper, we interpret a linear function ϕ as follows: For every state x, the vector ϕ([x])
is chosen as a vector of characteristics for x. In the example of the introduction, for instance,
the vector ϕ([A]) describes for each of the pairwise rankings whether this ranking is true or false
at A, and can thus be seen as a vector of characteristics for state A. Similarly for states B and
C. If the function ϕ is linear, the vector ϕ(β) for a given belief β may then be interpreted as
the expected vector of characteristics induced by the belief β and the vectors {ϕ([x]) | x ∈ X}.
In the introductory example, the vector ϕ(β) specifies for each pairwise ranking the probability
that β assigns to the event of this ranking being true, and hence represents the expected vector
of characteristics under β.
If the function ϕ is linear and one-to-one, it is easily seen that ϕ transforms the original belief
simplex B(X) into a polytope ϕ(B(X)) with the same dimension, and cornerpoints {ϕ([x]) |
x ∈ X}. The following condition states that for every point and every face in this polytope, the
orthogonal projection of this point on the face is contained in the polytope.
Definition 3.3 (Closed under orthogonal projections) A linear one-to-one function ϕ : B(X)→
R
m is called closed under orthogonal projections if for every β1 ∈ B(X) and every E ⊆ X there
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is some β2 ∈ B(X|E) such that
(ϕ(β2)− ϕ(β1)) ⊥ (ϕ(β3)− ϕ(β4))
for all β3, β4 ∈ B(X|E).
Here, ⊥ means “orthogonal to”. Hence, ϕ(β2) is the orthogonal projection of ϕ(β1) on the
face ϕ(B(X|E)). Note that this orthogonal projection is always unique. We are now ready the
present the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 3.4 (Representation Theorem). LetX be a finite set of states, and br a belief revision
function on X. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) The belief revision function br is linear, transitive and information-order independent;
(2) There is a Euclidean space Rm and a linear one-to-one function ϕ : B(X) → Rm, closed
under orthogonal projections, such that br satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ.
For the remainder of this paper, whenever we say that ϕ represents the belief revision function
br, we mean that br satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ.
4 Proof of the Representation Theorem
4.1 Minimal Belief Revision implies Axioms
The easy part is to show the implication from (2) to (1). Assume that br satisfies minimal belief
revision (MBR) with respect to a linear one-to-one function ϕ : B(X)→ Rm that is closed under
orthogonal projections. We show that br is linear, transitive and information-order independent.
Linearity. Choose a pair of states a, b ∈ X. We first show that br(β1|{a, b}) = β1 whenever
β1 ∈ B(X|{a, b}). Let β1 ∈ B(X|{a, b}) and β2 = br(β1|{a, b}). By MBR,
‖ϕ(β2)− ϕ(β1)‖ ≤ ‖ϕ(β3)− ϕ(β1)‖
for all β3 ∈ B(X|{a, b}). However, as β1 ∈ B(X|{a, b}) and ϕ is one-to-one, this is only possible
when β2 = β1, hence br(β1|{a, b}) = β1.
Now, choose β1, β2 ∈ B(X) and α ∈ [0, 1]. Let β := αβ1 + (1 − α)β2, and let βrev1 :=
br(β1|{a, b}), βrev2 := br(β2|{a, b}), βrev := br(β|{a, b}).We show that βrev = αβrev1 +(1−α)βrev2 .
By MBR,
‖ϕ(βrev1 )− ϕ(β1)‖ ≤ ‖ϕ(β3)− ϕ(β1)‖
for all β3 ∈ B(X|{a, b}). Since ϕ is closed under orthogonal projections, this is equivalent to
ϕ(βrev1 )− ϕ(β1) ⊥ ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b]). (1)
Similarly,
ϕ(βrev2 )− ϕ(β2) ⊥ ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b]). (2)
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Define β˜rev := αβrev1 + (1− α)βrev2 . Then, by (1), (2), and linearity of ϕ,
ϕ(β˜rev)− ϕ(β) ⊥ ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b]),
which, by MBR, implies that βrev = β˜rev. Hence, βrev = αβrev1 +(1−α)βrev2 . Together with the
insight that br(β1|{a, b}) = β1 whenever β1 ∈ B(X|{a, b}), it follows that br is linear.
Transitivity. Suppose that br(β|{a, b}) = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[b] and br(β|{a, c}) = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c]. By MBR
and the fact that ϕ is closed under orthogonal projections, this is equivalent to stating that
ϕ(1
2
[a] + 1
2
[b])− ϕ(β) ⊥ ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b]),
ϕ(1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c])− ϕ(β) ⊥ ϕ([a]) − ϕ([c]).
This, in turn, implies that
‖ϕ(β)− ϕ(a)‖ = ‖ϕ(β)− ϕ(b)‖ and ‖ϕ(β)− ϕ(a)‖ = ‖ϕ(β) − ϕ(c)‖ .
As such,
‖ϕ(β)− ϕ(b)‖ = ‖ϕ(β)− ϕ(c)‖
yielding
ϕ(1
2
[b] + 1
2
[c]) − ϕ(β) ⊥ ϕ([b]) − ϕ([c])
and hence, by MBR, br(β|{b, c}) = 1
2
[b] + 1
2
[c]. We may thus conclude that br is transitive.
Information-order independence. Let E1, E2 be two events with E2 ⊆ E1, and let β be some
initial belief. By MBR, we have that
ϕ(br(β|E1))− ϕ(β) ⊥ ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b])
for all a, b ∈ E1, and
ϕ(br(br(β|E1)|E2))− ϕ(br(β|E1)) ⊥ ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b])
for all a, b ∈ E2. By combining these two facts, we may conclude that
ϕ(br(br(β|E1)|E2))− ϕ(β) = (ϕ(br(β|E1))− ϕ(β)) + ϕ(br(br(β|E1)|E2))− ϕ(br(β|E1))
⊥ ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b])
for all a, b ∈ E2. As such, br(β|E2) = br(br(β|E1)|E2), and hence we may conclude that br is
information-order independent.
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4.2 Axioms imply Minimal Belief Revision
The difficult part is to show that the axioms linearity (LIN), transitivity (TRA) and information-
order independence (IOI) imply that br is represented by some linear one-to-one function ϕ :
B(X)→ Rm that is closed under orthogonal projections. For a given such function ϕ, let brϕ be
the (unique) belief revision function that is represented by it. Take some belief revision function
br that satisfies LIN, TRA and IOI. We shall prove that there is some linear one-to-one function
ϕ : B(X)→ Rm, closed under orthogonal projections, such that br = brϕ.
The outline of this proof is as follows: Take a belief revision function br that satisfies the
three axioms. For a given function ϕ, let dϕ(a, b) := ‖ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b])‖ be the induced distance
between states a and b. In Section 4.2.1, we present a system of equations for dϕ that is shown
to be necessary and sufficient for br = brϕ. In Section 4.2.2 we construct a distance function
d that satisfies this system of equations. In Section 4.2.3, finally, we prove that there is some
linear one-to-one function ϕ : B(X) → Rm, closed under orthogonal projections, with dϕ = d.
Hence, for this particular ϕ we would have that br = brϕ , which would complete the proof. In
this section, we give for each lemma an intuitive argument that is easy to understand, and at
the same time reveals the main idea behind the proof. The formal algebraic proofs are included
in the appendix. The philosophy is to first provide the reader with a picture of how the proof
works, before confronting the reader with all the technical details.
4.2.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for br = brϕ
In this part we derive a system of equations for dϕ that is both necessary and sufficient for
br = brϕ. We proceed in two steps. As a first step, we show that br and brϕ coincide if and only
if they coincide on every triangle {a, b, c}. Hence, a belief revision function satisfying the axioms
LIN, TRA and IOI is completely determined by its behavior on triangles. In the second step,
we provide a system of equations for dϕ that is necessary and sufficient for the event that br
and brϕ coincide on every triangle. Combined with the first step, this system if also necessary
and sufficient for br = brϕ.
In order to prove the first step we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 If br([a]|{b, c}) = [b], then br([c]|{a, b}) = [b] and br([b]|{a, c}) /∈ {[a], [c]).
Intuitive argument. Consider Figure 5 as an illustration. Suppose that br([a]|{b, c}) = [b],
and let
A := br([c]|{a, b}), B := 1
2
[a] +
1
2
[c], C := br(B|{b, c}) and D := br(B|{a, b}).
By LIN, line BC must be parallel to line ab, and hence C = 1
2
[b]+ 1
2
[c]. But then, br(B|{a, c}) =
1
2
[a]+ 1
2
[c] and br(B|{b, c}) = 1
2
[b]+ 1
2
[c]. By TRA, it must then hold that D = 1
2
[a]+ 1
2
[b]. Since,
by LIN, cA must be parallel to BD, it follows that A = [b], as was to show.
Hence, we know that br([a]|{b, c}) = [b] implies br([c]|{a, b}) = [b]. We now show that, under
this assumption, br([b]|{a, c}) /∈ {[a], [c]). Suppose, on the contrary, that br([b]|{a, c}) = [a].
Consider Figure 6 as an illustration. Let
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Figure 5: A geometrical argument for Lemma 4.1
a bC
B A
c
Figure 6: A geometrical argument for Lemma 4.1
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Figure 7: Belief revision on triangles is decisive
A :=
1
2
[b] +
1
2
[c], B := br(A|{a, c}) and C := br(A|{a, b}).
By LIN, AB is parallel to ba, and hence B = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c]. Then, br(A|{b, c}) = 1
2
[b] + 1
2
[c] and
br(A|{a, c}) = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c]. By TRA, it follows that C = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[b]. But then, AC is not parallel
to cb, which contradicts LIN. Similarly, br([b]|{a, c}) = [c] would lead to a contradiction as well.
3
We now prove that it is sufficient to check that br and brϕ agree on every triangle.
Lemma 4.2 (Belief revision on triangles is decisive) If br([c]|{a, b}) = brϕ([c]|{a, b}) for all
a, b, c ∈ X, then br = brϕ.
Intuitive argument. We provide an argument for the case of four states. Consider the
belief simplex in Figure 7 for the state space X = {a, b, c, d}. We show that the belief revi-
sion br([d]|{a, b, c}) is completely determined by the belief revisions br([d]|{a, b}), br([d]|[b, c}),
br([a]|{b, c}) and br([c]|{a, b}). Let the beliefs A, ..., F be as depicted in this figure. Hence, we
must prove that br([d]|{a, b, c}) is completely determined by A,B,E and F. The line CA de-
notes all the beliefs in B(X|{a, b, c}) that, upon observing {a, b}, are mapped to A. Similarly,
the line DB denotes all the beliefs in B(X|{a, b, c}) that, upon observing {b, c}, are mapped to
B. By LIN, CA is parallel to cE, and DB is parallel to aF. By Lemma 4.1, we know that it
cannot be the case that E = [a] and F = [c]. As such, the lines cE and aF cannot coincide,
implying that the lines CA and DB cannot be parallel. Hence, CA and DB have at most one
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ϕ([a]) ϕ([b])
ϕ([c])
ϕ(β1)
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α
Figure 8: Necessary conditions for br = brϕ
intersection point. On the other hand, IOI of br implies that br(br([d]|{a, b, c})|{a, b}) = A
and br(br([d]|{a, b, c})|{b, c}) = B. Hence, br([d]|{a, b, c}) should be on CA and DB. Since we
have seen that CA and DB intersect at most once, br([d]|{a, b, c}) is completely determined by
A,B,C and D. By LIN, C and D are completely determined by E and F. Hence, br([d]|{a, b, c})
is completely determined by A,B,E and F.
Since the same holds for brϕ, it follows that if br and brϕ coincide on the triangles {a, b, d}, {b, c, d}
and {a, b, c}, then br([d]|{a, b, c}) = brϕ([d]|{a, b, c}). By repeating this argument for the map-
pings of [a], [b] and [c] on the oppositive face of the simplex, and by using LIN of br and brϕ, we
may conclude the following: if br and brϕ coincide on every triangle, then br = brϕ, as was to
show. 3
We are now ready to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for br = brϕ. Assume for
the moment that br = brϕ. Take some states a, b, c ∈ X, let β1 := br([a]|{b, c}) and let β2 :=
br([c]|{a, b}). By definition of brϕ, it must then hold that
ϕ(β1)− ϕ([a]) ⊥ ϕ([b]) − ϕ([c]) and ϕ(β2)− ϕ([c]) ⊥ ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b]).
Figure 8 provides an illustration of these facts. Let the angle α be as in Figure 8 . Assume first
that α is less than 90 degrees. Then, β1(c) > 0, and
cosα =
β1(c) dϕ(b, c)
dϕ(a, b)
=
β2(a) dϕ(a, b)
dϕ(b, c)
which implies
dϕ(b, c)
dϕ(a, b)
=
√
β2(a)
β1(c)
. (3)
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Figure 9: Necessary conditions for br = brϕ
If the angle α is exactly 90 degrees, then β1(c) = β2(a) = 0, and (3) would not be well-defined.
In that case, consider the angle γ (less than 90 degrees) in Figure 9. Let β3 := br([b]|{a, c}).
Then, β3(c) > 0 and
cos γ =
β3(c) dϕ(a, c)
dϕ(a, b)
=
dϕ(a, b)
dϕ(a, c)
which implies that
dϕ(a, c)
dϕ(a, b)
=
√
1
β3(c)
.
Since dϕ(b, c) =
√
dϕ(a, c)2 − dϕ(a, b)2, it follows that
dϕ(b, c)
dϕ(a, b)
=
√
1
β3(c)
− 1 =
√
β3(a)
β3(c)
. (4)
The necessary conditions (3) and (4) for br = brϕ lead us to the following definition: For every
three states a, b, c define
λbr(a, b, c) :=


√
br([c]|{a, b})(a)
br([a]|{b, c})(c) , if br([a]|{b, c})(c) > 0√
br([b]|{a, c})(a)
br([b]|{a, c})(c) , if br([a]|{b, c})(c) = 0
. (5)
By Lemma 4.1 we know that br([a]|{b, c})(c) = 0 implies br([b]|{a, c})(c) > 0, and hence (5) is
well-defined. Note also that λbr(a, b, c) > 0 for all a, b, c. Assume, namely, that br([c]|{a, b})(a) =
0. Then, by Lemma 4.1, br([a]|{b, c})(c) = 0 and br([b]|{a, c})(a) > 0, which means that
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Figure 10: System (6) is sufficient for br = brϕ
λbr(a, b, c) > 0.On the other hand, if br([b]|{a, c})(a) = 0, then, by the same lemma, br([a]|{b, c})(c) =
1 and br([c]|{a, b})(a) > 0, and hence λbr(a, b, c) > 0.
By our insights above, we know that the system
dϕ(b, c)
dϕ(a, b)
= λbr(a, b, c) for all pairwise different a, b, c ∈ X (6)
provides a set of necessary conditions for br = brϕ. The following lemma states that this system
is also sufficient for br = brϕ.
Lemma 4.3 (Necessary and sufficient conditions for br = brϕ) The belief revision functions br
and brϕ coincide if and only if λbr and dϕ satisfy system (6).
Intuitive argument. From above, it should be clear that br = brϕ only if λbr and dϕ satisfy
(6). Now, suppose that λbr and dϕ satisfy (6). Choose some states a, b, c ∈ X. We prove that,
for fixed ϕ, the system (6) completely determines the belief revision function br on {a, b, c}.
Since, clearly, λbrϕ and dϕ satisfy the system (6) as well, it would follow that br and brϕ agree
on {a, b, c}. As this would hold for every a, b, c, Lemma 4.2 would imply that br = brϕ.
Consider the belief revisions
A := br([a]|{b, c}), B := br([b]|{a, c}) and C := br([c]|{a, b}),
as depicted in Figure 10. We show that A,B and C are completely determined by (6). Consider
the triangle ABC and the angles α, β and γ as shown in the same figure. Let the function ϕ be
fixed. Then, the equation
dϕ(b, c)
dϕ(a, b)
= λbr(a, b, c)
determines the ratio between br([c]|{a, b})(a) and br([a]|{b, c})(c). As such, it determines the
ratio between the lengths of the line segments bC and bA, and thereby determines the angle γ.
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Similarly, the equations
dϕ(c, a)
dϕ(b, c)
= λbr(b, c, a) and
dϕ(a, b)
dϕ(c, a)
= λbr(c, a, b)
determine the angles α and β, respectively. However, there is only one triangle ABC with A
on bc, B on ac and C on ab, inducing exactly these angles α, β and γ. Hence, A,B and C are
completely determined by (6). As such, the behavior of br on {a, b, c} is completely determined
by (6), as was to show. 3
4.2.2 Existence of distance function d solving system (6)
In this part we prove that there is some symmetric2 distance function d, assigning to each pair
a, b of states some positive number d(a, b), that satisfies the system of equations (6). That is,
we show that for the given belief revision function br there is some symmetric d with
d(b, c)
d(a, b)
= λbr(a, b, c)
for all pairwise different a, b, c ∈ X. We show this result in three steps. In step 1, we prove that
the system (6) admits a solution d if and only if “every cycle of λbr’s has product 1”. Below,
we explain what we exactly mean by this. In step 2, we show that it is sufficient to check that
every cycle of three λbr’s has product 1. In step 3 we show that, indeed, every cycle of three
λbr’s has product 1.
We first explain what we mean by a cycle of λbr’s. Consider two numbers λbr(a1, b1, c1)
and λbr(a2, b2, c2), where (a1, b1, c1) and (a2, b2, c2) are ordered triples of states. We say that
λbr(a1, b1, c1) and λbr(a2, b2, c2) are adjacent if {a2, b2} = {b1, c1}. Hence, λbr(a2, b2, c2) =
λbr(b1, c1, c2) or λbr(a2, b2, c2) = λbr(c1, b1, c2). A cycle of λbr’s is a sequence
(λbr(a1, b1, c1), λbr(a2, b2, c2), ..., λbr(aK , bK , cK))
of finite length such that λbr(ak, bk, ck) and λbr(ak+1, bk+1, ck+1) are adjacent for all k ∈ {1, ...,K−
1}, and λbr(aK , bK , cK) is adjacent to λbr(a1, b1, c1). The product of this cycle is defined as
λbr(a1, b1, c1) · λbr(a2, b2, c2) · ... · λbr(aK , bK , cK).
Lemma 4.4 (Every cycle of λbr’s must have product 1) The system of equations (6) admits a
solution d if and only if every cycle of λbr’s has product 1.
Intuitive argument. Obviously, (6) has a solution d only if every cycle of λbr’s has product
1. Assume, now, that every cycle of λbr’s has product 1. We show, for the case of four states,
that there is a solution d to (6). Let X = {a, b, c, d}, and define the distance function d by
d(a, b) : = 1,
d(a, c) : = λbr(b, a, c), d(a, d) := λbr(b, a, d),
d(b, c) : = λbr(a, b, c), d(b, d) := λbr(a, b, d),
d(c, d) : = λbr(a, b, c)λbr(b, c, d).
2By symmetric, we mean that d(a, b) = d(b, a) for all a, b.
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Figure 11: Triangle-3-cycles and star-3-cycles
Then, it may easily be checked that d and λbr satisfy (6). For instance,
d(d, c)
d(a, d)
=
λbr(a, b, c)λbr(b, c, d)
λbr(b, a, d)
= λbr(a, b, c)λbr(b, c, d)λbr(d, a, b)
=
1
λbr(c, d, a)
λbr(a, b, c)λbr(b, c, d)λbr(c, d, a)λbr(d, a, b)
=
1
λbr(c, d, a)
= λbr(a, d, c).
Here, the second and the fifth equality follow from the fact that 1/λbr(x, y, z) = λbr(z, y, x). The
fourth equality follows from the assumption that the product of the four λbr’s is 1, since this
sequence is a cycle of λbr’s. Similarly, one can verify that the other equations in (6) are satisfied.
3
We next show that it is sufficient to check for the products of 3-cycles. A 3-cycle of λbr’s is
simply a cycle containing 3 λbr’s. It is easily seen that there exist two types of 3-cycles:
(λbr(a, b, c), λbr(b, c, a), λbr(c, a, b)) and (λbr(b, a, c), λbr(c, a, d), λbr(d, a, b)).
We refer to these two types as triangle-3-cycles and star-3-cycles, respectively. See Figure 11
for an illustration. From this picture, it also becomes clear why we have chosen these names.
Lemma 4.5 (Checking for 3-cycles is sufficient) Every cycle of λbr’s has product 1 if and only
if every 3-cycle of λbr’s has product 1.
Intuitive argument. We illustrate this lemma by means of the following example. Consider
the state space X = {a, b, c, d}, and assume that every 3-cycle of λbr’s has product 1. We show
that the 4-cycle
(λbr(a, b, c), λbr(b, c, d), λbr(c, d, a), λbr(d, a, b))
has product 1. Since every star-3-cycle has product 1, we have that
λbr(a, b, c)λbr(c, b, d)λbr(d, b, a) = 1 and λbr(c, d, a)λbr(a, d, b)λbr(b, d, c) = 1,
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Figure 12: Decomposition of cycle into 3-cycles
or, equivalently,
λbr(a, b, c) = λbr(a, b, d)λbr(d, b, c) and λbr(c, d, a) = λbr(c, d, b)λbr(b, d, a).
We thus obtain
λbr(a, b, c)λbr(b, c, d)λbr(c, d, a)λbr(d, a, b)
= λbr(a, b, d)λbr(d, b, c)λbr(b, c, d)λbr(c, d, b)λbr(b, d, a)λbr(d, a, b)
= [λbr(a, b, d)λbr(b, d, a)λbr(d, a, b)] [λbr(d, b, c)λbr(b, c, d)λbr(c, d, b)] = 1,
where the latter sequence consists of two triangle-3-cycles for which the product, by assumption,
is 1. Hence, we have decomposed the 4-cycle into two triangle-3-cycles, using the fact that every
star-3-cycle has product 1. See Figure 12 for an illustration of this method. The formal proof is
based on exactly this method. 3
We now prove that, indeed, every 3-cycle of λbr’s has product 1. This would eventually imply
that there exists a distance function d such that d and λbr satisfy the system (6).
Lemma 4.6 Every triangle-3-cycle of λbr’s has product 1.
Intuitive argument. Consider a triangle {a, b, c}.We show that λbr(a, b, c)λbr(b, c, a)λbr(c, a, b) =
1. Let A := br([a]|{b, c}), B := br([b]|{a, c}) and C := br([c]|{a, b}). By Ab we denote the prob-
ability that A assigns to state b. Similarly, we define Ac, Ba, Bc, Ca and Cb. We focus on the
case where A and C are in the interior of the line segments bc and ab, respectively, as illustrated
in Figure 13. Then, by Lemma 4.1, also B must be in the interior of the line segment ac, and
hence
λbr(a, b, c) =
√
Ca
Ac
, λbr(b, c, a) =
√
Ab
Ba
, λbr(c, a, b) =
√
Bc
Cb
.
Showing that λbr(a, b, c)λbr(b, c, a)λbr(c, a, b) = 1 thus amounts to proving that
AbBcCa = AcBaCb.
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Figure 13: Every triangle-3-cycle of λbr’s has product 1
By Ceva’s theorem, this is equivalent to showing that the three lines aA, bB and cC are concur-
rent3. More precisely, Ceva’s theorem states that the three lines aA, bB and cC are concurrent
if and only if
‖A− [c]‖ ‖B − [a]‖ ‖C − [b]‖ = ‖A− [b]‖ ‖B − [c]‖ ‖C − [a]‖ . (7)
However, since
Ab =
‖A− [c]‖
‖[b]− [c]‖ , Ac =
‖A− [b]‖
‖[b]− [c]‖ ,
and similarly for Bc, Ba, Ca and Cb, (7) is equivalent to AbBcCa = AcBaCb.
We now show that aA, bB and cC are concurrent. Note that the lines aA and cC intersect at
some point D in the triangle (see Figure 13). That is, br(D|{a, c}) = A and br(D|{a, b}) = C.
Let a′ := 1
2
[b] + 1
2
[c], b′ := 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c] and c′ := 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[b], and let D′ be the “image” of D in
the triangle a′b′c′. That is,
D′ = Daa
′ +Dbb
′ +Dcc
′.
Similarly, let A′ and C ′ be the images of A and C, as depicted in the second triangle of Figure 13.
Then, the lines A′a′ and C ′c′ intersect at the pointD′. Since the lines A′a′ and C ′c′ are parallel to
the lines aA and cC, respectively, we may conclude that br(A′|{b, c}) = a′ and br(C ′|{a, b}) = c′.
Hence, br(D′|{b, c}) = a′ and br(D′|{a, b}) = c′. By TRA, it follows that br(D′|{a, c}) = b′. Let
B′ be the point on a′c′ such that B′b′ contains D′. Then, br(B′|{a, c}) = b′, which implies
that the line B′b′ is parallel to the line bB, and hence B′ must be the image of B. Since the
lines A′a′, B′b′ and C ′c′ are concurrent, and A′, a′, B′, b′, C ′, c′ are the images of A, a,B, b, C, c,
respectively, it follows that the lines aA, bB and cC must be concurrent, which was to prove. 3
Lemma 4.7 Every star-3-cycle of λbr’s has product 1.
Intuitive argument. Let a, b, c, d ∈ X. We show that λbr(a, d, b)λbr(b, d, c)λbr(c, d, a) = 1.
Assume that the beliefs A,B, ..., P are as depicted in Figure 14. Here, A := br([a]|{b, c}), and
3That is, the three lines intersect at a single point.
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Figure 14: Every star-3-cycle of λbr’s has product 1
similarly for B,C, ..., I. We define J := br([d]|{a, b, c}). By K,L and M we denote the mapping
of J on {a, b, d}, {b, c, d} and {a, c, d}, respectively. Finally, N,O and P are the mappings of J
on {a, d}, {b, d} and {c, d}, respectively. By definition,
λbr(a, d, b) =
√
Ba
Ab
, λbr(b, d, a) =
√
Eb
Dc
, λbr(c, d, a) =
√
Hc
Ga
,
where Ba is the probability that B assigns to a, and so on. Hence, we must prove that
BaEbHc = AbDcGa.
Note that, by Lemma 4.6, the lines aA, bB and dC are concurrent. The same holds for the
lines bD, cE and dF and for the lines cG, aH and dI. Note also that, by IOI,
br(K|{a, b}) = br(J |{a, b}) = br([d]|{a, b}) = C,
and hence K lies on the line dC. Similarly, L and M lie on the lines dF and dI, respectively.
Moreover, by IOI,
br(K|{a, d}) = br(J |{a, d}) = N,
and hence, by LIN, line KN is parallel to line bB. Similarly for the lines KO,LO,LP,MP and
MN.
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But then, it is easily seen from the figure that
Ba
Ab
=
Na
Ob
,
Eb
Dc
=
Ob
Pc
,
Hc
Ga
=
Pc
Na
,
which implies that
Ba
Ab
Eb
Dc
Hc
Ga
= 1.
Hence, BaEbHc = AbDcGa, which was to show. 3
Combining Lemmas 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 thus leads to the following conclusion.
Corollary 4.8 There is a symmetric distance function d such that d and λbr satisfy system (6).
4.2.3 Existence of function ϕ with brϕ = br
By Corollary 4.8 we know that there is some distance function d such that d and λbr solve (6).
We shall now explicitly construct a linear one-to-one mapping ϕ : B(X) → Rn−1, closed under
orthogonal projections, for which the induced distance function dϕ coincides with d. As before,
n denotes the number of states. Then, dϕ and λbr would satisfy (6). By Lemma 4.3 it would
then follow that brϕ = br, and hence br would satisfy minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ.
This would thus complete the proof of our Theorem 3.4.
We first show the reader how we construct ϕ for the case of three and four states, respectively,
and provide for both cases a geometrical argument as to why the induced distance function
coincides with d. We then provide a general formula for ϕ, and show that dϕ = d.
Case of three states. Let X = {a, b, c}, and let the distance function d be such that d and
λbr satisfy (6). We construct ϕ : B(X)→ R2 as follows. We choose
ϕ([a]) := (0, 0) and ϕ([b]) := (d(a, b), 0).
Since ϕ must be linear, we define
ϕ(β) := β(a)ϕ([a]) + β(b)ϕ([b])
for all β ∈ B(X|{a, b}). Now, let A := br([c]|{a, b}) and B := br(A|{a, c}), as depicted in Figure
15. Since ϕ is to be constructed such that br = brϕ, the vector ϕ(A)−ϕ([c]) must be orthogonal
to ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a]), and hence
ϕ([c]) = ϕ(A) + h(0, 1)
for some h > 0. The question is how to choose h. Let α be the angle as depicted in Figure 15.
Since ϕ(B)− ϕ(A) must be orthogonal to ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a]), we have
cosα =
h
‖ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])‖ =
Ba ‖ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])‖
h
.
Since, moreover, we want to construct ϕ such that dϕ = d, we may substitute ‖ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])‖ =
d(a, c), and obtain
h =
√
Bad(a, c).
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Figure 15: Construction of ϕ for three states
Hence,
ϕ([c]) := ϕ(A) +
√
Bad(a, c)(0, 1).
By defining
ϕ(β) := β(a)ϕ([a]) + β(b)ϕ([b]) + β(c)ϕ([c])
for all β ∈ B(X), the construction of ϕ is complete.
We shall now show that dϕ = d. Clearly, dϕ(a, b) = d(a, b). By construction,
‖ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])‖2 = ‖ϕ([c]) − ϕ(A)‖2 + ‖ϕ(A) − ϕ([a])‖2 = Bad2(a, c) + ‖ϕ(A)− ϕ([a])‖2
= d2(a, c) −Bcd2(a, c) + ‖ϕ(A) − ϕ([a])‖2 .
By LIN of br, we have that B = Aa[a] +AbC and hence Bc = AbCc. As such,
‖ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])‖2 = d2(a, c) −AbCcd2(a, c) + ‖ϕ(A)− ϕ([a])‖2 .
Since d and λbr satisfy (6), it follows that d(a, c)/d(a, b) = λbr(b, a, c), which implies that
Ccd
2(a, c) = Abd
2(a, b). Consequently,
‖ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])‖2 = d2(a, c) −AbAbd2(a, b) + ‖ϕ(A) − ϕ([a])‖2
= d2(a, c) − ‖ϕ(A)− ϕ([a])‖2 + ‖ϕ(A)− ϕ([a])‖2 = d2(a, c).
Hence, dϕ(a, c) = d(a, c). We now prove that ‖ϕ([c]) − ϕ([b])‖ = d(b, c). From Figure 15, it is
clear that Ba/Db = Ca/Eb. Moreover, since d and λbr satisfy (6), we have that d(b, c)/d(a, c) =
λbr(a, c, b), which yields Ca/Eb = d
2(b, c)/d2(a, c). Hence, Ba/Db = d
2(b, c)/d2(a, c), which im-
plies
√
Bad(a, c) =
√
Dbd(b, c). As such, we may conclude that
h =
√
Dbd(b, c).
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Figure 16: Construction of ϕ for four states
By using a similar argument as we used above for dϕ(a, c), we may then show that dϕ(b, c) =
d(b, c). Hence, dϕ = d, as was to show. 3
Case of four states. Let X = {a, b, c, d}, and let d be such that d and λbr satisfy (6). We
construct ϕ : B(X) → R3 as follows. From the case of three states, we know how to construct
ϕ([a]), ϕ([b]), ϕ([c]) ∈ R3, with the last coordinate of each of these vectors being zero, such that
dϕ and d coincide on B(X|{a, b, c}). We show how to construct ϕ([d]). Let A := br([d]|{a, b, c})
and B := br(A|{a, d}), as depicted in Figure 16. As ϕ has to be constructed such that br satisfies
minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ, it must be the case that ϕ(A) − ϕ([d]) is orthogonal
to the triangle spanned by ϕ([a]), ϕ([b]) and ϕ([c]). Hence,
ϕ([d]) = ϕ(A) + h(0, 0, 1)
for some h > 0. It remains to determine h. Let α be the angle as depicted in Figure 16. Since
ϕ(B)− ϕ(A) is orthogonal to ϕ([d]) − ϕ([a]), we have
cosα =
h
‖ϕ([d]) − ϕ([a])‖ =
Ba ‖ϕ([d]) − ϕ([a])‖
h
,
hence we must set
h =
√
Ba ‖ϕ([d]) − ϕ([a])‖ =
√
Bad(a, d), (8)
as we wish to achieve that ‖ϕ([d]) − ϕ([a])‖ = d(a, d). By defining
ϕ(β) = β(a)ϕ([a]) + β(b)ϕ([b]) + β(c)ϕ([c]) + β(d)ϕ([d])
for all β ∈ B(X), the construction of ϕ is complete.
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Figure 17: Construction of ϕ for four states
We now show that dϕ = d. By the case of three states, we already know that dϕ and d
coincide on {a, b, c}. We first show that dϕ(a, d) = d(a, d). Let the beliefs C, ..,H be as depicted
in Figure 17. By construction,
‖ϕ([d]) − ϕ([a])‖2 = h2 + ‖ϕ(A) − ϕ([a])‖2 = Bad2(a, d) + ‖ϕ(A)− ϕ([a])‖2
= d2(a, d) −Bdd2(a, d) + ‖ϕ(A) − ϕ([a])‖2 . (9)
We show thatBdd
2(a, d) = ‖ϕ(A) − ϕ([a])‖2 . By LIN of br, we have thatB = Aa[a]+AbD+AcH,
and hence Bd = AbDd +AcHd. As such,
Bdd
2(a, d) = AbDdd
2(a, d) +AcHdd
2(a, d).
Since d and λbr satisfy (6), we have that d(a, d)/d(a, b) = λbr(b, a, d), which implies that
Ddd
2(a, d) = Cbd
2(a, b). Similarly, d(a, d)/d(a, c) = λbr(c, a, d), implying that Hdd
2(a, d) =
Gcd
2(a, c). Substituting these identities in the equation above yields
Bdd
2(a, d) = AbCbd
2(a, b) +AcGcd
2(a, c) = AbCb ‖ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a])‖2 +AcGc ‖ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])‖2 .
(10)
By IOI of br, we have that C = br(A|{a, b}). From the case of three states we know that
br satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ on {a, b, c}. Hence, ϕ(C) − ϕ([a]) is the
orthogonal projection of ϕ(A) − ϕ([a]) on ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a]), which means that
ϕ(C)− ϕ([a]) = 〈ϕ(A) − ϕ([a]), ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a])〉‖ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a])‖2 (ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a])),
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where 〈·〉 denotes the dot product between vectors. Hence,
‖ϕ(C)− ϕ([a])‖ = 〈ϕ(A)− ϕ([a]), ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a])〉‖ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a])‖ ,
which implies that
Cb ‖ϕ([b])− ϕ([a])‖2 = ‖ϕ(C)− ϕ([a])‖ ‖ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a])‖
= 〈ϕ(A) − ϕ([a]), ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a])〉 .
Similarly, we may conclude that
Gc ‖ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])‖2 = 〈ϕ(A)− ϕ([a]), ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])〉 .
Together with (10), this yields
Bdd
2(a, d) = Ab 〈ϕ(A)− ϕ([a]), ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a])〉 +Ac 〈ϕ(A)− ϕ([a]), ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])〉
= Aa 〈ϕ(A) − ϕ([a]), ϕ([a]) − ϕ([a])〉 +Ab 〈ϕ(A)− ϕ([a]), ϕ([b]) − ϕ([a])〉 +
+Ac 〈ϕ(A)− ϕ([a]), ϕ([c]) − ϕ([a])〉
= 〈ϕ(A) − ϕ([a]), (Aaϕ([a]) +Abϕ([b]) +Acϕ([c])) − ϕ([a])〉
= 〈ϕ(A) − ϕ([a]), ϕ(A) − ϕ([a])〉 = ‖ϕ(A)− ϕ([a])‖2 .
Substituting this result in (9) leads to the conclusion that
‖ϕ([d]) − ϕ([a])‖2 = d2(a, d),
which implies that dϕ(a, d) = d(a, d). We now prove that dϕ(b, d) = d(b, d). Let I := br(A|{b, d})
and J := br([a]|{b, d}), as depicted in Figure 17. From the discussion of Figure 14 earlier in this
paper we know that Ba/Ib = Da/Jb. Since d(b, d)/d(a, d) = λbr(a, d, b), it follows that Da/Jb =
d2(b, d)/d2(a, d), and hence Ba/Ib = d
2(b, d)/d2(a, d). As such,
√
Bad(a, d) =
√
Ibd(b, d). Since
we have seen in (8) that h =
√
Bad(a, d), it follows that
h =
√
Ibd(b, d).
But then, by using the same argument as above, one can show that dϕ(b, d) = d(b, d). The proof
for dϕ(c, d) = d(c, d) is similar. Hence, we may conclude that dϕ = d, as was to show. 3
The case of n states. The cases for three and four states already suggest how the general
construction of the function ϕ for the case of n states should look like. Let X = {x1, ..., xn}. We
define a linear one-to-one function ϕ : B(X)→ Rn−1 as follows: Let 0 denote the zero vector in
R
n−1, and let {e1, ..., en−1} denote the canonical basis for Rn−1. Define
ϕ([x1]) := 0, ϕ([x2]) := d(x1, x2)e1,
and
ϕ(β) := β(x1)ϕ([x1]) + β(x2)ϕ([x2])
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for all β ∈ B(X|{x1, x2}). For every k ∈ {3, ..., n}, let Xk−1 = {x1, ..., xk−1}, and recursively
define
ϕ([xk]) := ϕ(br([xk]|Xk−1)) +
√
br(br([xk]|Xk−1)|{x1, xk})(x1) · d(x1, xk)ek−1,
and
ϕ(β) :=
k∑
i=1
β(xi)ϕ([xi])
for all β ∈ B(X|{x1, ..., xk}). In the following lemma, we show that this function ϕ has all the
desired properties.
Lemma 4.9 (Existence of ϕ with dϕ = d). Let ϕ be the function defined above. Then, ϕ is
linear, one-to-one and closed under orthogonal projections, and dϕ = d.
Intuitive argument. We first show, by induction on k, that dϕ and d coincide on {x1, ..., xk}
for every k ∈ {3, ..., n}. For k = 3, this follows from our argument above for three states. Suppose
that k ≥ 4 and that dϕ and d coincide on {x1, ..., xk−1}. We show that dϕ(x1, xk) = d(x1, xk).
Define A := br([xk]|Xk−1) and B := br(A|{x1, xk}). Then, we have that
ϕ([xk]) = ϕ(A) +
√
Bx1d(x1, xk)ek−1.
Clearly,
‖ϕ([xk])− ϕ([x1])‖2 = ‖ϕ([xk])− ϕ(A)‖2 + ‖ϕ(A)− ϕ([x1])‖2
= Bx1d
2(x1, xk) + ‖ϕ(A)− ϕ([x1])‖2
= d2(x1, xk)−Bxkd2(x1, xk) + ‖ϕ(A) − ϕ([x1])‖2 .
By using the same techniques as in our proof for four states, one can show that
Bxkd
2(x1, xk) = ‖ϕ(A) − ϕ([x1])‖2 ,
and hence ‖ϕ([xk])− ϕ([x1])‖2 = d2(x1, xk), implying that dϕ(x1, xk) = d(x1, xk).
We now show that dϕ(xi, xk) = d(xi, xk) for every i ∈ {2, ..., k− 1}. Let C := br(A|{xi, xk}).
Then, using the same method as in our argument for four states, one can show that√
Bx1d(x1, xk) =
√
Cxid(xi, xk)
and hence
ϕ([xk]) = ϕ(A) +
√
Cxid(xi, xk).
Using the same argument as above, one can then show that dϕ(xi, xk) = d(xi, xk). By induction,
it then follows that dϕ = d.
Since it is clear, by construction, that ϕ is linear and one-to-one, it only remains to show
that ϕ is closed under orthogonal projections. It is sufficient to show that for every cornerpoint
ϕ([xk]) of the polytope ϕ(B(X)), and for every face ϕ(B(X|E)) with E ⊆ X, the orthogonal
projection of ϕ([xk]) on ϕ(B(X|E)) lies in ϕ(B(X|E)).
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By construction of ϕ, the orthogonal projection of ϕ([xk]) on ϕ(B(X|{x1, ..., xk−1})) is equal
to ϕ(br([xk]|{x1, ..., xk−1)), which lies in ϕ(B(X|{x1, ..., xk−1})). As such, we may conclude that
for every k ∈ {3, ..., n} and every subset E ⊆ {x1, ..., xk−1}, the orthogonal projection of ϕ([xk])
on ϕ(B(X|E)) lies in ϕ(B(X|E)).
Now, choose some arbitrary state yk ∈ X, and some arbitrary event E = {y1, ..., yk−1} ⊆ X
containing k−1 states, but not containing yk.We show that the orthogonal projection of ϕ([yk])
on ϕ(B(X|E)) is contained in ϕ(B(X|E)). Let X\(E ∪ {yk}) = {yk+1, ..., yn}. Suppose that we
would apply the algorithm above, used to compute ϕ, not with respect to the order x1, x2, ..., xn,
but with respect to the order y1, y2, ..., yn. This would yield some other function, say ϕ˜, and hence
some other polytope, ϕ˜(B(X)). However, by using the same argument as above, one could
then still prove that ‖ϕ˜([a])− ϕ˜([b])‖ = d(a, b) for all a, b ∈ X. That is, ‖ϕ˜([a]) − ϕ˜([b])‖ =
‖ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b])‖ for all a, b ∈ X, and hence the two polytopes ϕ(B(X)) and ϕ˜(B(X)) are
isomorphic. By construction, the orthogonal projection of ϕ˜([yk]) on ϕ˜(B(X|{y1, ..., yk−1})) is
equal to ϕ˜(br([yk]|{y1, ..., yk−1})), which lies in ϕ˜(B(X|{y1, ..., yk−1})). Hence, the orthogonal
projection of ϕ˜([yk]) on ϕ˜(B(X|E)) is contained in ϕ˜(B(X|E)). Since ϕ(B(X)) is isomorphic to
ϕ˜(B(X)), it follows that also the orthogonal projection of ϕ([yk]) on ϕ(B(X|E)) is contained
in ϕ(B(X|E)). Since this holds for all yk ∈ X and all E ⊆ X\{yk}, we may conclude that ϕ is
closed under orthogonal projections. This completes the argument for this lemma. 3
We are now fully equipped to prove the representation theorem. Let br be a belief revision
function that satisfies the axioms LIN, TRA and IOI. Then, by Corollary 4.8, there is some
distance function d such that d and λbr satisfy the system (6) of equations. Moreover, by
Lemma 4.9, there is some linear one-to-one function ϕ : B(X)→ Rn−1, closed under orthogonal
projections, with dϕ = d. Hence, dϕ and λbr satisfy (6), which, by Lemma 4.3, implies that
br = brϕ. Hence, br satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to the function ϕ, which is
linear, one-to-one and closed under orthogonal projections. This completes the proof of the
representation theorem.
5 Discussion
5.1 Independence of the Axioms
It can easily be shown that the three axioms LIN, TRA and IOI are independent.
LetX1 = {a, b, c}, and let br1 be such that br1([a]|{b, c}) = [b], br1([b]|{a, c}) = br1([c]|{a, b}) =
[a], and br1(β|{x, y}) is the revised belief obtained by Bayesian updating whenever β assigns
positive probability to x or y, for all x, y ∈ X1. Then, br1 satisfies TRA and IOI, but not LIN.
LetX2 = {a, b, c}, and let br2 be such that br2([a]|{b, c}) = [b], br2([b]|{a, c}) = br2([c]|{a, b}) =
[a], and br2(β|{x, y}) = β(x)[x]+β(y)[y]+β(z)br2([z]|{x, y}) for all beliefs β, and all x, y, z ∈ X2.
Then, br2 satisfies LIN and IOI, but not TRA, since br2(
1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c]|{b, c}) = 1
2
[b] + 1
2
[c],
br2(
1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c]|{a, c}) = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c], whereas br2(
1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c]|{a, b}) = [a] 6= 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[b].
LetX3 = {a, b, c, d}, and let br3 be the linear belief revision function generated by br3([x]|{y, z}) =
1
2
[y] + 1
2
[z] for all x, y, z ∈ X3, br3([d]|{a, b, c}) = [a] and br3([x]|X3\{x}) = [d] for every
x ∈ X3\{d}. Then, br3 satisfies LIN and TRA, but not IOI, since br3([d]|{a, b}) = 12 [a] + 12 [b],
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whereas
br3(br3([d]|{a, b, c})|{a, b}) = br3([a]|{a, b}) = [a] 6= br3([d]|{a, b}).
5.2 Uniqueness of the Function ϕ
By the representation theorem we know that for every belief revision function br satisfying LIN,
TRA and IOI there is some linear one-to-one function ϕ, closed under orthogonal projections,
such that br satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ. Moreover, the proof of the
representation theorem provides an algorithm to compute one such ϕ. Namely, the proof of
Lemma 4.4 shows how for a given br we may compute a distance function d such that d and λbr
satisfy (6). In Section 4.2.3 we show how for such a distance function d we may subsequently
compute a linear one-to-one function ϕ, closed under orthogonal projections, with dϕ = d. Hence,
br satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to this particular ϕ.
We now focus on the question to what extent this function ϕ is unique. That is, how much
freedom do we have when choosing a function ϕ such that br satisfies minimal belief revision
with respect to ϕ? Assume that br satisfies the three axioms, and that ϕ, ϕ˜ are two different
such functions with br = brϕ = brϕ˜. Then, by Lemma 4.3, it follows that dϕ and λbr satisfy
(6), but also dϕ˜ and λbr satisfy (6). By the structure of the system (6), this implies that there
is some scalar α > 0 with dϕ˜(a, b) = αdϕ(a, b) for all a, b ∈ X. Hence, ‖ϕ˜([a]) − ϕ˜([b])‖ =
α ‖ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b])‖ for all a, b ∈ X, which means that the polytopes ϕ(B(X)) and ϕ˜(B(X)) are
isomorphic. We thus arrive at the following conclusion:
Lemma 5.1 (Uniqueness of ϕ) Let br be a belief revision function satisfying LIN, TRA and
IOI. Let ϕ, ϕ˜ be two linear one-to-one functions, closed under orthogonal projections, such that
br satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ and ϕ˜. Then, there is some α > 0 such that
‖ϕ˜([a])− ϕ˜([b])‖ = α ‖ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b])‖ for all a, b ∈ X.
Obviously, the other direction is also true: If br satisfies minimal belief revision with respect
to ϕ, and ϕ˜ is such that ‖ϕ˜([a]) − ϕ˜([b])‖ = α ‖ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b])‖ for all a, b ∈ X, then br also
satisfies minimal belief revision with respect to ϕ˜. In other words, if we have found one ϕ with
br = brϕ, then we know how to generate all other ϕ˜ with br = brϕ˜.
5.3 Representing States by Boolean Vectors
From the main theorem we know that for a given belief revision function br satisfying the three
axioms we may construct a function ϕ such that br satisfies minimal belief revision with respect
to ϕ. In many practical examples it seems plausible that the decision maker reasons in the other
direction: he may first choose a function ϕ, measuring the similarity between states from his
personal perspective, and then minimally revise his beliefs with respect to ϕ. That is, he first
chooses ϕ, then br. The question remains how to choose ϕ in an adequate manner. A possible
way to do this would be as follows: One first makes a list of properties that states may have or
not have, and that seem relevant for the decision problem at hand. Subsequently, one defines for
each state x a Boolean vector ϕ([x]) of zeros and ones which specifies for each property whether
it is “true” (1) or “false” (0) at state x, like we did with the example in the introduction. For
every belief β, the vector ϕ(β) would then be a vector of true-false-probabilities, specifying for
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each property the probability that it is deemed true in the belief β. For every two states, the
induced distance ‖ϕ([a]) − ϕ([b])‖ would then be equal to
√
dis(a, b), where dis(a, b) denotes
the number of properties on which a and b disagree. This distance is also called the Hamming
distance. By the proof of Lemma 4.3, the belief revision function br that satisfies minimal belief
revision with respect to ϕ would be such that
br([c]|{a, b})(a) = dis(a, b) + dis(b, c) − dis(a, c)
2dis(a, b)
for all states a, b, c ∈ X. (We must make sure that ϕ is closed under orthogonal projections
such that this number is between 0 and 1). That is, upon observing that the real state is
in {a, b} and state c is impossible, more weight is shifted towards the state in {a, b} that has
minimal Hamming distance to c. More generally, the belief revision function br would select for
every initial belief β1 and every event E the revised belief β2 ∈ B(X|E) for which the vector of
true-false-probabilities is as close as possible to the vector of true-false-probabilities for β1.
6 Appendix: Algebraic Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1. The proof of this lemma is basically a direct translation of the geo-
metrical argument, as provided in Section 4, into formal algebraic statements. It is therefore
omitted here. 
For the proof of Lemma 4.2, we need the following property.
Lemma 6.1 Let br satisfy LIN, TRA and IOI. Then, for every belief β ∈ B(X) and every event
E ⊆ X it holds that
br(β|E) =
∑
x∈E
β(x)[x] +
∑
x∈X\E
β(x)br([x]|E). (11)
Proof of Lemma 6.1. We prove (11) by induction on |E|, where |E| denotes the cardinality
of E.
If |E| = 2, (11) follows directly from LIN of br.
Now, take some E with |E| = k > 2, and suppose that (11) holds for all β′ ∈ B(X) and all
E′ with |E′| < k. Choose some a, b ∈ E, some belief β ∈ B(X), and define
βE := br(β|E), βE\a := br(βE |E\{a}) and βE\b := br(βE |E\{b}).
By the induction assumption,
βE\a = βE(a)br([a]|E\{a}) +
∑
x∈E\{a}
βE(x)[x],
βE\b = βE(b)br([b]|E\{b}) +
∑
x∈E\{b}
βE(x)[x].
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Since, by IOI, βE\a = br(β|E\{a}) and βE\b = br(β|E\{b}), we have
br(β|E\{a}) = βE(a)br([a]|E\{a}) +
∑
x∈E\{a}
βE(x)[x],
br(β|E\{b}) = βE(b)br([b]|E\{b}) +
∑
x∈E\{b}
βE(x)[x].
In particular,
br(β|E\{a})(b) = βE(a)br([a]|E\{a})(b) + βE(b),
br(β|E\{b})(a) = βE(b)br([b]|E\{b})(a) + βE(a),
or, equivalently,[
br([a]|E\{a})(b) 1
1 br([b]|E\{b})(a)
] [
βE(a)
βE(b)
]
=
[
br(β|E\{a})(b)
br(β|E\{b})(a)
]
. (12)
The determinant of the matrix above is
br([a]|E\{a})(b) · br([b]|E\{b})(a) − 1.
We show that this determinant is not zero. Assume, on the contrary, that the determinant would
be zero. Then, br([a]|E\{a})(b) = 1 and br([b]|E\{b})(a) = 1, which means that br([a]|E\{a}) =
[b] and br([b]|E\{b}) = [a]. Choose some c ∈ E\{a, b}. By IOI,
br([a]|{b, c}) = br(br([a]|E\{a})|{b, c}) = br([b]|{b, c}) = [b],
br([b]|{a, c}) = br(br([b]|E\{b})|{a, c}) = br([a]|{a, c}) = [a],
which would contradict Lemma 4.1. Hence, the determinant is not zero. As such, the system
(12) has a unique solution (βE(a), βE(b)) with, in particular,
br(β|E)(a) = βE(a) = br(β|E\{b})(a) − br([b]|E\{b})(a) · br(β|E\{a})(b)
1− br([a]|E\{a})(b) · br([b]|E\{b})(a) . (13)
By the induction assumption, we know that
br(β|E\{a}) =
∑
x∈E\{a}
β(x)[x] + β(a)br([a]|E\{a}) +
∑
x∈X\E
β(x)br([x]|E\{a}),
br(β|E\{b}) =
∑
x∈E\{b}
β(x)[x] + β(b)br([b]|E\{b}) +
∑
x∈X\E
β(x)br([x]|E\{b}),
which implies that
br(β|E\{a})(b) = β(b) + β(a)br([a]|E\{a})(b) +
∑
x∈X\E
β(x)br([x]|E\{a})(b),
br(β|E\{b})(a) = β(a) + β(b)br([b]|E\{b})(a) +
∑
x∈X\E
β(x)br([x]|E\{b})(a).
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By substituting these two equations in (13), we eventually obtain
br(β|E)(a) = β(a) +
∑
x∈X\E
β(x)
br([x]|E\{b})(a) − br([b]|E\{b})(a) · br([x]|E\{a})(b)
1− br([a]|E\{a})(b) · br([b]|E|{b})(a)
= β(a) +
∑
x∈X\E
β(x)br([x]|E)(a), (14)
where the latter equality follows from applying (13) to the initial belief [x]. Since (14) holds for
every a ∈ E, we may conclude that
br(β|E) =
∑
x∈E
β(x)[x] +
∑
x∈X\E
β(x)br([x]|E),
which was to show. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Assume that br and brϕ coincide on every triangle. We prove that
br = brϕ. To that purpose, we show that
br(β|E) = brϕ(β|E) (15)
for every belief β ∈ B(X) and every event E ⊆ X. We show (15) by induction on |E|.
If |E| = 2, say E = {a, b}, (15) follows by the assumption that br([x]|{a, b}) = brϕ([x]|{a, b})
for every x ∈ X\{a, b}, and the fact that br and brϕ satisfy LIN.
Now, let |E| = k > 2, and assume that (15) holds for every belief β′ and every event E′ with
|E′| < k. Since br and brϕ satisfy LIN, TRA and IOI, we know, by the proof of Lemma 6.1, that
both br and brϕ satisfy (13). That is,
br(β|E)(a) = br(β|E\{b})(a) − br([b]|E\{b})(a) · br(β|E\{a})(b)
1− br([a]|E\{a})(b) · br([b]|E|{b})(a) ,
brϕ(β|E)(a) = brϕ(β|E\{b})(a) − brϕ([b]|E\{b})(a) · brϕ(β|E\{a})(b)
1− brϕ([a]|E\{a})(b) · brϕ([b]|E\{b})(a)
for every a, b ∈ E. Since, by the induction assumption, br(β|E\{a}) = brϕ(β|E\{a}), br(β|E\{b}) =
brϕ(β|E\{b}), br([a]|E\{a}) = brϕ([a]|E\{a}) and br([b]|E\{b}) = brϕ([b]|E\{b}) for every
a, b ∈ E, it follows that br(β|E)(a) = brϕ(β|E)(a) for every a ∈ E, and hence br(β|E) =
brϕ(β|E). This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. We have already seen that br and dϕ must satisfy (6) if br = brϕ.
Now, assume that λbr and dϕ satisfy system (6). We show that this implies br = brϕ. In view
of Lemma 4.2 it is sufficient to show that br([c]|{a, b}) = brϕ([c]|{a, b}) for every triple a, b, c of
pairwise different states. Choose some arbitrary triple a, b, c of states, and define
β1 := br([a]|{b, c}), β2 := br([c]|{a, b}) and β3 := br([b]|{a, c}).
By Lemma 4.1, there are four possible cases to distinguish.
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Case 1. If β1 /∈ {[b], [c]}, β2 /∈ {[a], [b]} and β3 /∈ {[a], [c]}. Then,
λ2br(a, b, c) =
β2(a)
β1(c)
, λ2br(b, c, a) =
β1(b)
β3(a)
and λ2br(c, a, b) =
β3(c)
β2(b)
.
Since λbr and dϕ satisfy (6), it follows that
β1(c) d
2
ϕ(b, c) = β2(a) d
2
ϕ(a, b),
β3(a) d
2
ϕ(c, a) = β1(b) d
2
ϕ(b, c),
β2(b) d
2
ϕ(a, b) = β3(c) d
2
ϕ(c, a).
It may easily be shown that this system, for fixed dϕ, has a unique solution β1, β2, β3. In partic-
ular, this system implies that
br([c]|{a, b})(a) = β2(a) =
d2ϕ(a, b) + d
2
ϕ(b, c)− d2ϕ(c, a)
2d2ϕ(a, b)
.
Case 2. If β2 = [a], β3 = [a], and β1 /∈ {[b], [c]}. Then,
λ2br(a, b, c) =
1
β1(c)
, λ2br(b, c, a) = β1(b) and λ
2
br(c, a, b) =
β1(c)
β1(b)
.
Since λbr and dϕ satisfy (6), it follows that
β1(c) d
2
ϕ(b, c) = d
2
ϕ(a, b),
d2ϕ(c, a) = β1(b) d
2
ϕ(b, c),
β1(b) d
2
ϕ(a, b) = β1(c) d
2
ϕ(c, a).
Consequently,
d2ϕ(a, b) + d
2
ϕ(c, a) = β1(c) d
2
ϕ(b, c) + β1(b) d
2
ϕ(b, c) = d
2
ϕ(b, c).
Hence,
br([c]|{a, b})(a) = β2(a) = 1 =
d2ϕ(a, b) + d
2
ϕ(b, c) − d2ϕ(c, a)
2d2ϕ(a, b)
.
Case 3. If β2 = [b], β1 = [b] and β3 /∈ {[a], [c]}. By the same method as in Case 2, one can
show that
d2ϕ(a, b) + d
2
ϕ(b, c) = d
2
ϕ(c, a)
and hence
br([c]|{a, b})(a) = β2(a) = 0 =
d2ϕ(a, b) + d
2
ϕ(b, c) − d2ϕ(c, a)
2d2ϕ(a, b)
.
Case 4. If β1 = [c], β3 = [c] and β2 /∈ {[a], [b]}. Then,
λ2br(a, b, c) = β2(a), λ
2
br(b, c, a) =
β2(b)
β2(a)
and λ2br(c, a, b) =
1
β2(b)
.
36
Since λ and dϕ satisfy (6), we have that
d2ϕ(b, c) = β2(a) d
2
ϕ(a, b),
β2(a) d
2
ϕ(c, a) = β2(b) d
2
ϕ(b, c),
β2(b) d
2
ϕ(a, b) = d
2
ϕ(c, a).
Hence,
β2(a) =
d2ϕ(b, c)
d2ϕ(a, b)
and
d2ϕ(b, c) + d
2
ϕ(c, a) = β2(a) d
2
ϕ(a, b) + β2(b) d
2
ϕ(a, b) = d
2
ϕ(a, b).
As such,
br([c]|{a, b})(a) = β2(a) =
d2ϕ(b, c)
d2ϕ(a, b)
=
d2ϕ(a, b) + d
2
ϕ(b, c) − d2ϕ(c, a)
2d2ϕ(a, b)
.
Since these are all possible cases, we may conclude that, in general,
br([c]|{a, b})(a) = d
2
ϕ(a, b) + d
2
ϕ(b, c) − d2ϕ(c, a)
2d2ϕ(a, b)
(16)
for all a, b, c ∈ X.
On the other hand, also λbrϕ and dϕ satisfy (6), since this system provides necessary condi-
tions for br = brϕ. By the same method as above, one can then show that
brϕ([c]|{a, b})(a) =
d2ϕ(a, b) + d
2
ϕ(b, c)− d2ϕ(c, a)
2d2ϕ(a, b)
for all a, b, c ∈ X. Hence, br([c]|{a, b}) = brϕ([c]|{a, b}) for all a, b, c ∈ X. But then, Lemma 4.2
guarantees that br = brϕ. 
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Obviously, if (6) has a solution d, then every cycle of λbr’s must have
product 1. Assume now that every cycle of λbr’s has product 1, and let X = {x1, x2, ..., xn}. We
define the distance function d by
d(x1, x2) : = 1,
d(x1, xi) : = λbr(x2, x1, xi) for all i ≥ 3,
d(x2, xi) : = λbr(x1, x2, xi) for all i ≥ 3,
d(xi, xj) : = λbr(x1, x2, xi)λbr(x2, xi, xj) for all 3 ≤ i < j.
Finally, let d(xi, xj) := d(xj , xi) whenever i > j. We prove that d satisfies (6). To that purpose,
we show that
d(xj , xk)
d(xi, xj)
= λbr(xi, xj , xk)
37
for all triples (xi, xj , xk). We must distinguish various cases, depending on whether some of the
states in {xi, xj , xk} is x1 or x2, whether j < k or not, and whether i < j or not. For the sake
of brevity, we shall only deal with one case here, since the proofs for all other cases are similar.
Consider the case where xi, xj, xk /∈ {x1, x2}, and where i < j < k. Then,
d(xj , xk)
d(xi, xj)
=
λbr(x1, x2, xj)λbr(x2, xj , xk)
λbr(x1, x2, xi)λbr(x2, xi, xj)
= λbr(x1, x2, xj)λbr(x2, xj , xk)λbr(xi, x2, x1)λbr(xj , xi, x2)
=
1
λbr(xk, xj , xi)
λbr(x1, x2, xj)λbr(x2, xj , xk)λbr(xk, xj , xi)λbr(xj , xi, x2)λbr(xi, x2, x1)
=
1
λbr(xk, xj , xi)
= λbr(xi, xj , xk).
Here, the fourth equality follows from the assumption that the product of the 5 λbr’s is 1, since
this sequence is a cycle of λbr’s. The other cases can be shown in a similar fashion. 
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Assume that every 3-cycle of λbr’s has product 1. We show that every
K-cycle of λbr’s has product 1. We proceed by induction on K.
For K = 3, the statement follows trivially. Assume therefore that K ≥ 4, and that the
statement holds for all cycles of length less than K. Consider a K-cycle
C := (λbr(a1, b1, c1), λbr(a2, b2, c2), ..., λbr(aK , bK , cK)).
We distinguish three possible cases.
Case 1. Suppose that (a2, b2) = (b1, c1) and (bK , cK) = (a1, b1). Then, since star-3-cycles
have product 1,
λbr(a2, b2, c2) = λbr(b1, c2, c2) = λbr(b1, c1, a1)λbr(a1, c1, c2),
λbr(aK , bK , cK) = λbr(aK , a1, b1) = λbr(aK , a1, c1)λbr(c1, a1, b1).
Consequently, the product of C is equal to
[λbr(aK , bK , cK)λbr(a1, b1, c1)λbr(a2, b2, c2)] · [λbr(a3, b3, c3) · ... · λbr(aK−1, bK−1, cK−1)]
= [λbr(aK , a1, c1)λbr(c1, a1, b1)λbr(a1, b1, c1)λbr(b1, c1, a1)λbr(a1, c1, c2)] ·
· [λbr(a3, b3, c3) · ... · λbr(aK−1, bK−1, cK−1)]
= [λbr(c1, a1, b1)λbr(a1, b1, c1)λbr(b1, c1, a1)] ·
· [λbr(aK , a1, c1)λbr(a1, c1, c2)λbr(a3, b3, c3) · ... · λbr(aK−1, bK−1, cK−1)]
= [λbr(c1, a1, b1)λbr(a1, b1, c1)λbr(b1, c1, a1)] ·
· [λbr(aK , a1, b2)λbr(a1, b2, c2)λbr(a3, b3, c3) · ... · λbr(aK−1, bK−1, cK−1)]
= 1,
since the latter sequence consists of a triangle-3-cycle and a cycle of length K − 1 for which the
product, by the induction assumption, is 1.
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Case 2. Suppose that (a2, b2) = (c1, b1). Since star-3-cycles have product 1,
λbr(a1, b1, c1)λbr(a2, b2, c2) = λbr(a1, b1, c1)λbr(c1, b1, c2) = λbr(a1, b1, c2).
Hence, the product of C is equal to
λbr(a1, b1, c2)λbr(a3, b3, c3) · ... · λbr(aK , bK , cK)
= λbr(a1, b2, c2)λbr(a3, b3, c3) · ... · λbr(aK , bK , cK) = 1,
since the latter sequence is a cycle of length K − 1 for which the product, by the induction
assumption, is 1.
Case 3. Suppose that (bK , cK) = (b1, a1). Similarly to case 2, we can show here that the
product of C is 1.
By induction, the proof is complete. 
Proof of Lemma 4.6. Let a, b, c ∈ X.We show that λbr(a, b, c)λbr(b, c, a)λbr(c, a, b) = 1. Define
β1 := br([a]|{b, c}), β2 := br([c]|{a, b}), β3 := br([b]|{a, c}).
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Assume that β1 /∈ {[b], [c]}, β2 /∈ {[a], [b]} and β3 /∈ {[a], [c]}. Then,
λbr(a, b, c) =
√
β2(a)
β1(c)
, λbr(b, c, a) =
√
β1(b)
β3(a)
and λbr(c, a, b) =
√
β3(c)
β2(b)
,
and hence we must show that
β1(b)β2(a)β3(c) = β1(c)β2(b)β3(a). (17)
Define the belief
β :=
1
1− β1(c)β2(a) (β1(b)β2(a)[a] + β1(b)β2(b)[b] + β1(c)β2(b)[c]).
It may be verified, using LIN, that br(β|{b, c}) = β1 and br(β|{a, b}) = β2. We shall prove that
br(β|{a, c}) = β3.
Define β∗ := 1
3
[a] + 1
3
[b] + 1
3
[c], and let β′ := 3
2
β∗ − 1
2
β. Since β∗ = 1
3
β + 2
3
β′, we know by
LIN that
br(β∗|{a, b}) = 1
3
br(β|{a, b}) + 2
3
br(β′|{a, b}).
As, by LIN, br(β∗|{a, b}) = 1
3
[a]+ 1
3
[b]+ 1
3
β2, and since we know that br(β|{a, b}) = β2, it follows
that
1
3
β2 +
2
3
br(β′|{a, b}) = 1
3
[a] +
1
3
[b] +
1
3
β2,
implying that br(β′|{a, b}) = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[b]. In a similar fashion, one can show that br(β′|{b, c}) =
1
2
[b] + 1
2
[c]. By TRA, it then follows that br(β′|{a, c}) = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c]. Since β∗ = 1
3
β + 2
3
β′, LIN
implies that
br(β∗|{a, c}) = 1
3
br(β|{a, c}) + 2
3
br(β′|{a, c}).
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As br(β∗|{a, c}) = 1
3
[a] + 1
3
[c] + 1
3
β3 and br(β
′|{a, c}) = 1
2
[a] + 1
2
[c], it follows that
1
3
[a] +
1
3
[c] +
1
3
β3 =
1
3
br(β|{a, c}) + 1
3
[a] +
1
3
[c],
and hence br(β|{a, c}) = β3. As such, br(β|{b, c}) = β1, br(β|{a, b}) = β2 and br(β|{a, c}) = β3,
which, by LIN, implies that
β1(b)
β1(c)
=
β(b)
β(c)
,
β2(a)
β2(b)
=
β(a)
β(b)
,
β3(c)
β3(a)
=
β(c)
β(a)
.
But then,
β1(b)
β1(c)
β2(a)
β2(b)
β3(c)
β3(a)
= 1,
implying (17).
Case 2. Assume that Case 1 does not hold. We may assume, without loss of generality, that
β1 = [b]. Then, by Lemma 4.1, we have that β2 = [b], and β3 /∈ {[a], [c]}, and hence
λbr(a, b, c) =
√
β3(a)
β3(c)
, λbr(b, c, a) =
√
1
β3(a)
and λbr(c, a, b) =
√
β3(c).
It is clear that λbr(a, b, c)λbr(b, c, a)λbr(c, a, b) = 1, and hence the proof is complete. 
Proof of Lemma 4.7. Let a, b, c, d ∈ X. We show that λbr(a, d, b)λbr(b, d, c)λbr(c, d, a) =
1. Define the beliefs A,B, ..., P as in Figure 14. We show that λbr(a, d, b) =
√
Na/Ob. We
distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that A 6= [d]. Then, λbr(a, d, b) =
√
Ba/Ab, and hence we must show that
Na/Ob = Ba/Ab. In the intuitive argument we have seen that, by IOI, br(K|{a, b}) = C =
br([d]|{a, b}). Hence, by LIN, K = (1 − λ)C + λ[d] for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, we have seen
in the intuitive argument that N = br(K|{a, d}). Consequently, by LIN,
N = (1− λ)br(C|{a, d}) + λ[d] = (1− λ)(Ca[a] + CbB) + λ[d],
which implies that Na = (1 − λ)(Ca + CbBa). In a similar fashion, one can show that Ob =
(1− λ)(Cb + CaAb), and hence
Na
Ob
=
Ca + CbBa
Cb + CaAb
. (18)
From (17) in the proof of Lemma 4.6, we know that
AdBaCb = AbBdCa. (19)
Combining (18) and (19) yields
Na
Ob
=
Ca + CbBa
Cb + CaAb
=
AbBd(Ca + CbBa)
AbBd(Cb + CaAb)
=
AdBaCb +AbBdCbBa
AbBdCb +AdBaCbAb
=
Ba(Ad +AbBd)
Ab(Bd +AdBa)
=
Ba(Ad +AbBd)
Ab(Bd +Ad(1−Bd)) =
Ba(Ad +AbBd)
Ab(Ad +AbBd)
=
Ba
Ab
,
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which was to show.
Case 2. Suppose that A = [d]. Then, by Lemma 4.1, B = [d], and hence λbr(a, d, b) =√
Ca/Cb. Hence, we must show that Na/Ob = Ca/Cb. We know from (18) that
Na
Ob
=
Ca + CbBa
Cb + CaAb
which is equal to Ca/Cb, since Ba = Ab = 0.
Hence, we may conclude that, in general, λbr(a, d, b) =
√
Na/Ob. Similarly, we can show that
λbr(b, d, c) =
√
Ob/Pc and λbr(c, d, a) =
√
Na/Pc. Consequently, λbr(a, d, b)λbr(b, d, c)λbr(c, d, a) =
1, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.9. The proof for this lemma is basically a formal repetition of the intuitive
argument presented in Section 4.2.3, and is therefore omitted. 
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